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In this article, I will examine the phenomenon wherein white people feel that they 
can be impartial in discussions about racism. Specifically, I will argue that the 
experience of whiteness confers the belief that one can be impartial, that manifests 
itself in the appearance of an epistemic privilege. The phenomenological experience 
of whiteness is constituted in such a way as to ignore the racialized experience. 
Moreover, white people have privileged access to the majority’s hermeneutic 
resources, as these reflect and build upon this whiteness. In this regard, I will 
analyse the white and racialized phenomenological experiences and examine their 
epistemic consequences to show how impartiality can be conceived as a white 
epistemic privilege.  
Introduction 
In her article “I’m Done Debating Racism with the Devil”, Maya 
Rupert recalls experiences she lived involving a discussion about race 
and racism with white people. She noticed the tendency for them to 
“engage in these discussions with people of color by summoning the 
devil himself and treating racism as a political disagreement around 
which two opposing viewpoints can reasonably form1”. Because they 
are either unfamiliar, reluctant or do not follow the argumentation, 
the position of the devil’s advocate enables white people to challenge 
the discussion with counterarguments without needing them to give 
their personal opinion on the matter. This rhetoric strategy allows 
______________ 
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them to defend a position without having to actually hold it: “he 
reminded me that he wasn’t really disagreeing with me. The devil 
made him do it2”. 
The devil’s advocate is often justified by the desire to bring a 
neutral or impartial insight to the discussion. However, this strategy 
shows that, as Maya Rupert states it, “there is something at the core 
of the argument that they are (perhaps ashamedly) compelled by3”. 
Otherwise, they would be open to explore individually and 
subjectively the arguments raised by the racialized person. This shows 
that it is likely that the white person feels concerned by the matter. 
Indeed, she cannot be impartial, because she is an agent who hold 
beliefs, biases, etc. which, paradoxically, allow her to feel neutral 
towards the matter. There is an inconsistency between the white 
person’s belief that she is impartial, her reaction to the matter (using 
the devil's advocate), and her actual situated point of view. In light of 
this situation, we may wonder: why doe white people feel impartial 
even though they are not? Why does it feel legitimate to them to 
maintain such a position? Is she truly impartial and objective? If not, 
what are the epistemic consequences of holding this position in a 
discussion on racism ?  
I argue that the belief that she can be impartial is an epistemic 
privilege resulting from the experience of whiteness in a context of 
white supremacy. The concept of white supremacy refers to the 
historical domination of whites over non-whites when socio-political 
structures were explicitly racist. Many scholars, such as Charles Mills, 
argue that there is still a need to conceptualise and use the term 
because the enduring sociopolitical structures reifies the history of 
white domination: “insofar as the modern world has been 
foundationally shaped by European colonialism, there is a sense in 
which white supremacy could be seen as transnational, global4”. I will 
situate the argument at the intersection of three fields: first, 
phenomenology will help me to account for the white and non-white 
experiences. Then, I will refer to concepts from critical philosophies 
of race, such as white privilege and white ignorance to understands the 
impacts of whiteness on racialized experiences. Finally, I will borrow 
______________ 
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from Standpoint theories the concept of epistemic privilege. Precisely, in 
the first section, I will argue that: 1. A white person will benefit from 
the context of white supremacy, while a racialized person will 
experience racial oppression. 2. In this regard, the racialized person 
has an epistemic privilege when addressing the issue of racism 
because she experiences it. In the second section, I will argue that: 3. On 
the other hand, the white person has privileged access to the 
dominant hermeneutic resources, as they reflect and build upon 
whiteness. 4. White people therefore also have a type of epistemic 
privilege in a predominantly white society. 5. Precisely, we will see 
how this privilege manifests itself in the posture of impartiality. In the 
third section, I will finally examine how: 6. Impartiality generates white 
ignorance and 7. The epistemic harms this phenomenon causes. 
1. Phenomenological Experiences and Epistemic Privilege 
As a first step in the argument, I shall explain the phenomenon of 
white privilege. Current definitions of racism agree that it is not 
simply a socio-economic structure that disadvantages racialized 
people. According to Robin Di Angelo, it is rather an ideological 
system that systematizes the unequal distribution of privileges among 
different racial groups, therefore placing white people in a position of 
domination: “This unequal distribution benefits whites and 
disadvantages people of color overall and as a group5”. To exemplify 
this phenomenon, here are two manifestations of it that will also 
figure in my argument later on, presented in Peggy McIntosh’s census 
of fifty white privileges: “20. I can do well in a challenging situation 
without being called a credit to my race6” and “34. I can worry about 
racism without being seen as self-interested or self-seeking7”. 
Furthermore, this phenomenon must be understood in terms of 
relationships, dynamics, and actions and not simply as a result of a 
global structure. This avoids, as mentioned by Di Angelo, the 
prejudice that racism only concerns disadvantaged, racialized people 
and therefore unprivileged people. To this extent, several theorists of 
whiteness have looked at how white people position themselves 
______________ 
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within racism. They attempt to show the discrepancy between 
racialized people’s experience of historical oppression, and the 
privileges held by white people and their attitudes towards racism. 
Indeed, white people benefit from the “hierarchical racial system8” 
which means that they can function without questioning their 
whiteness and without experiencing a sense of otherness and 
differentiation. This constitutes the concept of white privilege and is, 
according to Michelle Fine, characterized by the protection of 
whiteness by the North American society. This systemic protection 
provides white people the necessary conditions to feel free from 
racial issues and thus to avoid experiencing “race-based stress9”: 
“This insulated environment of racial privilege builds white 
expectations for racial comfort while at the same time lowering the 
ability to tolerate racial stress10”.  
Now that I have situated the concept of whiteness in the 
contemporary context of racial issues, I will further investigate the 
phenomenological conditions underlying the experience of whiteness. 
As Sara Ahmed argues in “Phenomenology of Whiteness”, whiteness 
is a category of experience. This definition avoids the pitfall of 
essentializing the phenomenon of whiteness. Indeed, through her 
phenomenological analysis, Ahmed demonstrates that it is often 
falsely naturalized, made invisible and universalized, and therefore 
constantly institutionally reified. 
Sara Ahmed draws on Frantz Fanon’s work to whiteness has 
become institutionalized in such a way that it appears as a form of 
“public comfort11”, i.e. the world is built from and around whiteness. 
The world comfortably surrenders and is offered to white people, as 
it corresponds in every measure to their horizons of deployment; 
white bodies, in this space, can thus feel “at home”. Whiteness is 
what makes it possible for the white body to feel in the right place, to 
be a “body-at-home”: “if the world is made white, then the body-at-
home is one that can inhabit whiteness12”. She grounds her argument 
in Fanon’s analysis of colonialism, saying that it made the white world 
______________ 
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‘ready’ for white bodies and experiences and explaining how it 
othered non-white existences. Colonialism has made whiteness the 
implicit norm of common experience which has taken root into 
Western institutions: “spaces are orientated ‘around’ whiteness, 
insofar as whiteness is not seen13”. 
Consequently, white people are not exposed to other 
phenomenological experiences because they maintain the belief that 
there is only one “normal” way of being in the world. Sara Ahmed 
refers to Adrienne Rich’s concept of white solipsism to capture, beyond 
consciously held racist beliefs, the assumption that the experience of 
whiteness it is the only one constituting the world. As a “tunnel 
vision”, this assumption directs white people’s perspective such that 
they don’t see non-white experiences as “precious or significant14” as 
theirs. To clarify, white solipsism is not simply plain ignorance about 
racial issues. It’s the ignorance of how whiteness interacts with and 
impacts non-white people. Rich gives the example of guilt, as it makes 
white people feel bad about the other’s situation, but not in a way 
that they can understand and empathize with the person, but rather to 
center the feeling on them: it is “a preoccupation with our own 
feelings which prevents us from ever connecting with the experience 
of others15”. Thus, even if a white person is aware of how racial issues 
affect non-whites, the focus of their reflection remains the experience 
of the white person and not of the racialized person. 
I will now link the white phenomenological experience and the 
hermeneutical resources that are constituted from it to show how 
they create epistemic ignorance towards non-white experiences. A 
hermeneutical resource is a collective interpretive resource allowing to 
account for and to give meaning to reality. Miranda Fricker theorized 
how these resources can generate hermeneutic injustices by 
undermining someone’s ability to explain her social experience in an 
intelligible manner. Accordingly, a person might not be understood 
because she lacks hermeneutical resources, which means that she 
does not possess the concepts to make her testimony intelligible to 
her interlocutors. Since hermeneutical resources are collectively 
______________ 
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shared, they are based on concepts and realities made understandable 
to the majority. Fricker adds that access to hermeneutical resources is 
unequally distributed because of power dynamics: “relations of 
unequal power can skew shared hermeneutical resources so that the 
powerful tend to have appropriate understandings of their 
experiences16”. 
Thus, in contrast, minorities and oppressed social groups 
experiencing a reality that cannot be formulated with the normative 
and dominant hermeneutical resources will suffer from these 
shortcomings. Indeed, the understanding of their experience, as 
Fricker explains, will be reduced to an individual, punctual 
phenomenon that will remain unspeakable and obscure. It is through 
speaking and discussions amongst marginalized people that the 
common experience is brought to light and that new hermeneutical 
resources can be developed to shed light on the situation: “the 
process of sharing these half-formed understandings awakened 
hitherto dormant resources for social meanings17”. While some 
people can benefit from dominant hermeneutic resources because 
they can make their experiences intelligible using those resources, 
marginalized people work to expand and modify dominant 
hermeneutic resources to make their experiences visible and 
intelligible. In order to do so, they advocate for the epistemic 
legitimacy of their experiences that are not yet represented in 
recognized dominant hermeneutic resources. Feminist epistemologies 
have thus, among other things, conceptualized the notion of epistemic 
privilege.  
I will now elaborate on the concept of epistemic privilege. 
Normally, this term is mainly used in feminist epistemologies. It 
refers to the idea that, in a largely consensual way, “the constitution 
of experience by gender is asserted to be epistemologically 
significant18”. It means that a marginalized person has the possibility 
to formulate her experience in epistemic terms in a way that is far 
more revealing than others’ experiences. Why? Because this person is 
situated in her social context in such a way that she lives the 
experience of marginalization, thus giving her access to information 
______________ 
16 Fricker, M. (2007), Epistemic injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing, p. 148. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Bar on, B. (1993), “Marginality and Epistemic Privilege”, p. 83. 
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that makes explicit what she knows about this experience. Authors 
have broadened this definition to multiple types of oppression and 
marginalization. In this context, I will use it to refer to racialized 
people’s experiences of race and their epistemic resources. 
The use of epistemic privilege is not consensual amongst feminist 
epistemologies because, as Bat-Ami Bar On puts it, it becomes 
difficult to determine which of the marginalized groups have the 
most privileged epistemic access : “the source of the problem is the 
existence of multiple socially marginalized groups; is any one of these 
groups more epistemically privileged than the others […]?19” Despite 
this problem, I think it is still correct to say that an oppressed or 
marginalized person holds an epistemic position that gives her more 
complete resources about her situation with respect to her racial 
oppression than someone who does not experience it. Thus, I can 
restrict the understanding of epistemic privilege to a narrow context 
between a white person and a racialized person (which may also 
include other power dynamics such as sexism, classism, ability, etc.), 
to assert that the racialized person holds an epistemic privilege over 
her experience of racism. Also, Bar On asserts that although the 
concept of epistemic privilege is important in the process of 
marginalized groups coming to speak for themselves, it should stop 
to be used. Indeed, claiming epistemic authority through epistemic 
privilege somehow repeats traditional patterns that use authority as a 
form of domination : “although the empowerment […] is an 
important goal […], by claiming an authority based in epistemic 
privilege the group reinscribes the values and practices used to 
socially marginalize it by excluding its voice20’’. In this regard, I agree 
that the concept of epistemic privilege would need to be revisited. 
However, it does not seem sufficient to eliminate the use of this 
concept, because, precisely in a context of white supremacy in which 
there is dynamics of domination, it seems necessary to have a 
conceptual tool that allows us to diagnose the phenomenon. In this 
regard, I will argue that the concept of epistemic privilege can also 
apply to the experience of whiteness.  
I will now analyse how an epistemic privilege is related to 
whiteness. To understand why a racialized person, in the context of 
______________ 
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white supremacy, has an epistemic privilege regarding her experience 
of oppression, I must first formulate this experience in 
phenomenological terms, as I did previously with the experience of 
whiteness. If the white body’s experience does not realize how it 
takes place in spaces, then the racialized body has a totally different 
experience. As Fanon describes it, the encounters with white people 
can be truly negative and difficult: 
And then the occasion arose when I had to meet the white 
man's eyes. An unfamiliar weight burdened me. The real 
world challenged my claims. In the white world the man of 
color encounters difficulties the development of his bodily 
schema. Consciousness of the body is solely a negating 
activity21. 
Therefore, according to Fanon, a racialized body does not feel 
comfortable “at-home”, i.e. in its environment, because it is 
constituted by racist structures: “Below the corporeal schema I had 
sketched a historico-racial schema22”. The experience of the racialized 
body is structured by a tense relationship between one’s own 
experience and the projection of racist structures onto oneself. 
Whiteness is the condition making possible to take an orientation in 
space and to reach objects with ease: “White bodies are habitual 
insofar as they ‘trail behind actions’: they do not get ‘stressed’ in their 
encounters with objects or others, as their whiteness “goes 
unnoticed23”. In this regard, the white body is capable of fulfilling its 
aspirations, its capacities, etc., more than a racialized body. Thus, the 
possibility for white people to orientate themselves towards an ‘I can’ 
is a privilege reserved to white people because all the possibilities of 
mobility are open to them, which is not the case for racialized people. 
The non-white person is therefore intercepted in her mobility, i.e. the 
body’s ways and limits to engage in the world24, and thus, she does 
not have the possibility to concretely unfold all of her intentions in 
______________ 
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22 Ibid., p. 111. 
23 Ahmed, S. (2007), “Phenomenology of Whiteness”, p. 156. 
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the world. The consequence of being racialized in a world oriented 
for and by whiteness is the loss of a racialized person’s agency: 
“which means [...][being] diminished as an effect of the bodily 
extensions of others25”. 
Returning to our definition of epistemic privilege, we can 
conclude that a racialized person in the context of white supremacy 
has epistemic privilege over her experience as she experiences racial 
oppression. On the other hand, as mentioned above, a white person 
is in a context that allows her to ignore racial oppression. Therefore, 
white people do not have a privileged access to this type of 
experience. While their experience of whiteness does not give them 
an epistemic privilege about racial oppression, it gives them another 
type of epistemic privilege that I would like to develop in the next 
section. Precisely, I will argue that they have a privileged access to the 
majority of hermeneutic resources because they reflect and are built 
upon whiteness. 
2. Epistemic Privilege and Impartiality 
The goal in this section is to show how the concept of epistemic 
privilege can be broadened to the experience of dominant 
experiences. I will refer to the concept of epistemic privilege as the 
possibility for a white person to be able to use and to refer to the 
dominant hermeneutic resources. Indeed, as they reflect and 
correspond to the white experience, they can perfectly make 
intelligible the situation of whiteness since it is constitutive of the 
dominant hermeneutic resources. As we have seen, the commonly 
lived, normalized and dominant experience corresponds to the terms 
of whiteness. Thus, hermeneutical resources are made to respond to 
the white socio-historical perspective. When a white person argues 
with a racialized person, both share certain hermeneutical resources, 
and each possesses their own, based on their social conditions. 
However, the white person will be supported by the majority’s 
hermeneutical resources, which will give her the belief that her 
perspective is the norm and therefore she will think that she is 
impartial. 
______________ 
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My argument is that corroboration between white experience and 
the dominant hermeneutic resources is an epistemic privilege. It 
confers the possibility to feel impartial with respect to an issue 
involving racism. This epistemic privilege (white in this case) thus 
concretely manifests in a dialogue as the posture of impartiality which 
either constitutes or is part of this privilege. The current social 
conditions allow white people to feel unconcerned about racial issues 
because they do not feel racialized. Therefore, they can feel detached 
and as if they are outside the problem of racism, thus relegating this 
issue to racialized people. Impartiality is an expression of white 
privilege because a white person can afford to position herself on an 
issue, concerning racism for instance, without being perceived as 
biased for defending an ideology. She can argue for a certain 
argument without being reduced to her race, but rather considered as 
an epistemic agent in her own right, beyond race. White people hence 
have the privilege of being able to take position in a supposedly 
impartial way, which means that they do not have to bear the burden 
to justify how their posture is not initially biased by their “racialized” 
point of view.  
Therefore, when it comes to engaging in a testimonial exchange 
with a person who attempts to express an experience outside the 
white phenomenological experience and hermeneutical resources, the 
white person cannot properly understand it because she ignores how 
her whiteness makes her overlook the othered experience. My 
argument follows logically from what has been stated previously: I 
have argued that the belief that it is possible to be impartial is given 
by the phenomenological experience of whiteness. Accordingly, since 
this experience is underpinned by the preconception that whiteness is 
the only way to reveal the world, experiences that do not correspond 
to it will be othered and marginalized. In this way, as whiteness 
becomes the norm and is institutionalized, it allows white people to 
feel legitimized in their dialogical and epistemic postures. Therefore, 
when it comes to engaging in a testimonial exchange with a person 
who attempts to express an experience outside the white 
phenomenological experience, the white person cannot properly 
understand it because she ignores how her whiteness makes her 
overlook it. Thus, a person who has a phenomenological experience 
corresponding to this framework can refer to it and will exclude her 
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interlocutor from it. If feeling “at-home” is a privilege for white 
people, then the posture of impartiality that is attached to it is one as 
well. 
Hence, impartiality is part of the cognitive processes that lead 
back to white solipsism and therefore contribute to the maintenance 
of the dominant hermeneutical resources. Indeed, to feel impartial in 
a discussion is to believe that one’s position or idea better reflects 
reality than the interlocutor’s. However, as we have seen, this reality is 
epistemically forged by socio-historical and structural phenomena 
that partially account for reality and that lead to forms of ignorance. 
3. Impartiality and White ignorance 
This section will elaborate on the relationship between impartiality 
and the concept of white ignorance and their epistemic consequences 
in a dialogue. The dominant hermeneutical resources have historically 
been constructed from racialized social conditions that, according to 
Charles Mills, create a “racialized causality” between knowledge and 
non-knowledge. The “natural” point of view of whiteness, as 
discussed above, is the stepping-stone of the majority’s perception. 
Systems of knowledge must be constructed in a way that they 
respond to majority’s experience. Indeed, hermeneutical resources 
make reality intelligible, and therefore account for the white 
experience. Thus, according to Mills, race is at the origin of what we 
collectively know or do not know. The system of knowledge has been 
constructed in such a way that it obliterates what is outside of the 
white norm since it does not correspond to its horizon of 
signification. Knowledge outside of it will not make sense for the 
white majority, as it will not recall white experience. Charles Mills 
presents a very enlightening explanation: “P would be easily 
discoverable in a society were it not for widespread white racism, and 
that with additional research in the appropriate areas, P could be 
shown to have further implications26”. This passage explains that 
something might have been known if the research was not held back 
by forms of racism. Because society retains the white experience as 
the norm, anything outside this horizon of significance is obliterated. 
Hence, hermeneutical resources are partial and are based on what 
______________ 
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Mills calls white ignorance. White ignorance is a cognitive 
phenomenon shared by white people that is historicized by the 
removal of epistemological perspectives to account for their biases. 
Racialized causality is, according to Mills, what causes this ignorance, 
which is then perpetuated either by truly racist motivations or by a 
socio-structural transfer. White ignorance echoes hermeneutical 
oppression in the sense that the epistemic resources that make it 
possible to account for reality are partial because of a racist 
historicization that privileges white experience. Hermeneutical 
resources are therefore shaped by white ignorance. 
The system of knowledge makes reality intelligible. Practically, this 
conceptual grid is elaborated by how society is epistemically 
structured by relations of power: “concepts will not be neutral but 
oriented toward a certain understanding, embedded in sub-theories 
and larger theories about how things work27”. What Mills calls white 
normativity, the epistemic principle according to which Euro-American 
societies have established themselves as a socio-historical epicenter, 
has made it possible to forge a referential framework that constructs 
perceptions of reality. Thus, the framework and the perceptions of 
reality correspond to each other and are mutually valid from a 
dominant perspective: “with Europe's gradual rise to global 
domination, [...] a conviction of exceptionalism and superiority that 
seems vindicated by the facts, and thenceforth, circularly, shaping the 
perception of the facts28”. 
Back to the example of the white privilege presented by Peggy 
McIntosh: “34. I can worry about racism without being seen as self-
interested or self-seeking29”.This says that one can speak about racial 
issues without being accused of being motivated by an ideology or by 
personal motives. This example shows precisely how impartiality is a 
white epistemic privilege. Indeed, one must be a white person to be 
able to speak about racial issues without being accused of bias or lack 
of nuance. This is significant because it means that, to be perceived as 
legitimate to talk about these issues, one should not experience them 
personally to be impartial and neutral towards them. The white 
people’s voices seem to have superior epistemic value in speaking 
______________ 
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29 Zack, N. (2018), Philosophy of Race, an Introduction, p. 166. 
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about racial issues, which entails that the voices of people 
experiencing the negative consequences of white domination 
continue to be reduced to the epistemic posture of being biased, 
subjective and non-neutral. One could argue, in response, that white 
people simply do not initially claim to be in an epistemic posture of 
impartiality. They might believe to have only one opinion among 
others, beyond race and white domination. But my argument is that 
even if the white person is not voluntarily racist, the hermeneutical 
resources she deploys will be based on white ignorance. Therefore, as 
long as the person does not recognize that her epistemic posture is 
tainted by oppressive structures, she will somehow thereby renew 
white domination. Also, even the racialized person who tries to 
explain her experience of being racialized must first learn and 
assimilate the colonizer’s epistemic and linguistic resources to make 
her testimony intelligible: “to speak means to be in a position […] to 
support the weight of a civilization30”. This mechanism reinforces the 
oppressive structures because, as Fanon explains it, the colonized 
(racialized) person participates in her own oppression31 by using the 
tools that were used to assert and re-affirm her inferiority. Some will 
argue that this process can actually be useful to oppressed groups 
because they can speak up and challenge these resources more 
efficiently because they are accessible and intelligible to dominant 
groups more effectively: this “might promise a certain kind of 
liberation from the alienation32”. However, according to Fanon, the 
racialized person will constantly be limited by her racialized 
embodiment in front of the white person: “embodiment frames the 
linguistic performance and limits its significance33”. This limit can be 
understood in terms of epistemic injustices.  
Kristie Dotson, in her article “Tracking epistemic violence, 
tracking practices of silencing”, offers an account of epistemic 
oppression within dialogical relations via the concept of “pernicious 
ignorance”: “epistemic violence, then, is enacted in a failed linguistic 
exchange where a speaker fails to communicatively reciprocate owing 
______________ 
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to pernicious ignorance34”. Within this framework, I will now argue 
that impartiality as a white epistemic privilege produces a form of 
epistemic violence within linguistic exchanges because it maintains a 
pernicious ignorance of racialized people’s testimonies.  
How could impartiality produce epistemic violence? First, I need 
to explain what a failed linguistic exchange is. A linguistic exchange 
needs conditions of reciprocity, as Hornsby specifies, so that the two 
dialogical agents can understand each other and thus achieve a 
“successful linguistic exchange35”. Thus, a linguistic exchange fails 
when a speaker cannot be understood because her interlocutor is not 
qualified to receive and understand her testimony to some degree, 
refusing to communicate with her. Violence occurs precisely in this 
type of refusal, i.e. when it is due to pernicious ignorance, whether it 
is intentional or unintentional. However, accounting for epistemic 
violence against an epistemic agent due to pernicious ignorance is 
difficult because it is closely related to context: “all ignorance has the 
potential to be harmful, but ignorance becomes harmful only in 
certain circumstances and to the extent that it causes harm36”. How 
could pernicious ignorance be linked to the epistemic privilege of 
impartiality? Impartiality as a white epistemic privilege rekindles the 
majority’s norms and can impede a dialogue by maintaining a form of 
pernicious ignorance about the testimony of people in minority or in 
oppressed situations. The ignorance generating epistemic oppression 
imposes forms of silence and it hinders a dialogue by failing to 
recognize the epistemic value of a speaker as a knowing subject. As 
Dotson explains, as a result, certain social groups, such as black 
women, will have lower epistemic status because of their audience’s 
ignorance: “[...] ignorance produced by the construction of 
epistemically disadvantaged identities37”. According to Tuana, certain 
social identities are often perceived as indicating a lack of credibility. 
Consequently, pernicious ignorance contributes to maintaining 
unequal epistemic positions in a dialogue. Moreover, people with a 
social identity allowing them to be recognized for their true epistemic 
______________ 
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value (or even to benefit from a surplus of epistemic value) will 
benefit from their audience’s reciprocity because they can be 
perceived as credible knowers. However, a social group considered to 
lack credibility will become the victim of epistemic oppression, since 
dialogical reciprocity depends on the recognition of their epistemic 
status. Impartiality thus is a privilege, because to be able to situate 
oneself in this posture is only possible if one feels recognized 
epistemically. Therefore, one must belong to a privileged group or to 
a social identity supported by the majority’s epistemic resources. 
Impartiality also renews epistemic violence because it obliterates the 
interlocutor’s testimony by diminishing its epistemic value. 
Pretending to be more impartial than her interlocutor is to renew the 
preconception that one's epistemic situation is better placed to 
evaluate a situation. 
One might object that white people do not renew epistemic 
violence when they obliterate the testimony of a marginalized social 
group because they do not voluntarily renew pernicious ignorance. In 
this way, white people would only be part of the social structure, 
which would itself be responsible for the epistemic processes that 
silence the words of marginalized groups. To this extent, one could 
argue that the structural nature of white domination means that white 
people should not always be accused of committing acts of epistemic 
oppression. However, according to Dotson's conceptual framework, 
the restoration of acts of ignorance to their contexts can be divided 
into voluntary and involuntary acts. One can contextualize the 
different cases of epistemic oppression and avoid generalizing in a 
fixed framework. This conception avoids reproducing the same 
epistemic errors, for example, trying to detach oneself from the 
concreteness of dialogical and epistemic schemes. Moreover, the aim 
is precisely to explain how epistemic structures influence individual 
attitudes to highlight the importance of taking responsibility by 
acknowledging one’s privileges. 
Conclusion 
In this paper, I aimed to expose the phenomenological and 
epistemological ramifications of the posture of impartiality as a 
privilege held by those who can benefit from the majority’s epistemic 
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resources socio-historically constituted around and by whiteness. A 
lived experience is based on a situated, and therefore partial, point of 
view, which is itself constituted by a socio-historical context 
prioritizing whiteness. This leads to the occultation of other lived 
experiences, which is transposed epistemologically through the feeling 
of being impartial. Indeed, the majority’s experience conceals the 
partiality of its point of view by this posture of impartiality. Hence, 
impartiality generates and maintains epistemic oppressions that cause 
harm on two levels. On a hermeneutical level, impartiality renews 
structures of oppression precisely because it maintains ignorance, or, 
in other words, because it maintains the knowledge system as it is, in 
all its partiality. On a testimonial level, the person who sees herself 
devalued in her testimony because her interlocutor overvalues her 
own posture cannot be truly understood and thus is silenced. 
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